

**Submission
No 28**

**A FRAMEWORK FOR PERFORMANCE REPORTING AND DRIVING
WELLBEING OUTCOMES IN NSW**

Organisation: Fire Brigade Employees' Union

Date Received: 14 August 2024

Partially
Confidential



29 July 2024

Mr Jason Yat-Sen Li, MP
Chair, Public Accounts Committee
Parliament House
Macquarie St
Sydney NSW 2000

Dear Mr Li,

A Framework for Performance Reporting and Driving Wellbeing Outcomes in NSW

Part 1: Introduction

The Fire Brigade Employees' Union of NSW (**FBEU**) is a trade union registered under the Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW). The FBEU represents over 6000 permanent and retained professional firefighters in Australia's largest fire and rescue agency, Fire and Rescue NSW (**FRNSW**). The agency is responsible for the provision of fire, rescue and hazmat services in cities and towns across the State and guarantee a high quality, and reliable, rapid response.

The Terms of Reference (**ToR**) for this inquiry indicate a priority to drive efficient service delivery while demonstrating the '*prudent and transparent*' use of public money. Performance indicators for service delivery which are *purposeful, comparable, timely, relatable, and measurable* are identified as being core pillars for such an endeavour.

The FBEU commends the timeliness of this inquiry noting, with concern, that an absence of an effective risk-based framework within the NSW emergency service sector is currently inhibiting the delivery of effective emergency services across NSW.

Part 2: Emergency Response & Sound Data

The FBEU has long supported greater transparency of emergency response data to enhance government decision-making, accountability, and to improve outcomes across NSW.

The FBEU respectfully submits that the adoption of **standards of fire cover** across the State is imperative to the development of a framework capable of demonstrating measurable improvements to service delivery. The term 'standard of fire cover' describes the level of service provided by an emergency service agency for the control and suppression of a fire. Standards should be underpinned by accepted scientific research and provide quality data insights to inform government decision-making. Response times, that is the time that it takes the fire service to respond to an incident, are an integral part of any standard and should be mandated by the NSW State Government.

In 2023, FRNSW published the report 'Adverse Structure Fire Outcomes 2016 – 2021'.¹ The report, peer-reviewed by Monash University, documented a statistically significant increase in fire fatalities across FRNSW jurisdictions. The report underscored the importance of response times from appropriately resourced, and urgently dispatched firefighters in increasing survivability in a structural fire and in minimising loss of life and property. The report identified that response times from firefighters were '*critical in preventing fatalities*', noting that survivability in a structural fire began to decrease significantly after only four minutes from the point of fire ignition.

The modern construction of buildings and furnishings, including widespread increases in synthetic products, rapidly increases the spread of fires today, exposing firefighters and the public to unprecedented levels of risk. These circumstances reinforce response time performance as critically important to community outcomes.

The number of qualified firefighters promptly dispatched to the incident, identified as the **weight of attack**, is equally important and enables safe and effective firefighting operations. As part of recent industrial reforms, FRNSW will now guarantee that two FRNSW appliances with eight qualified professional firefighters are dispatched to incidents within the agency's jurisdictions. However, no such arrangements exist for residents living in rural fire districts (**RFD**) which are maintained by the NSW Rural Fire Service (**RFS**). Crucial to these discussions is the acknowledgment that the RFS do not guarantee a response, suitably resourced or otherwise, to incidents whereas the *Fire and Rescue NSW Act 1989* stipulates that FRNSW *must* respond.

The FBEU submits that more must be done by the NSW State Government to inform and educate the NSW public on the standard of fire response applicable to their residential area.

Part 3: Not Just Fire – Road Crash Rescue Case Study

Beyond fire, FRNSW firefighters also serve the NSW public through the provision of rescue response, in particular road crash rescue (**RCR**). RCR response is increasingly important with NSW recording a 23% increase in road fatalities in the 2023 – 2024 period, almost triple that of neighbouring states.²

Evidence-based, well resourced, RCR response is fundamentally important to improving service delivery and reversing this trend. The World Health Organisation's Global Status Report on Road Safety emphasises response times, from appropriately resourced RCR responders, as a crucial pillar of road safety.³ These realities, along with the increased demands of a rapidly growing State, highlight an urgent need to improve rescue capability in NSW.

RCR arrangements in Victoria were reviewed in 2017 with several outcomes that have enabled significant improvements in road fatality statistics.⁴ Primarily, these standards highlight key factors such as weight of attack, including minimum crewing; response times, to guarantee service provision; training, skills and equipment maintenance. Fundamentally, however, all Victorian RCR providers *must* maintain and demonstrate rigorous record keeping. In return, data insights are used to inform government decision-making, specifically the allocating of

¹ Fire and Rescue NSW, [Adverse Structure Fire Outcomes 2016 – 2021](#), 2023, Fire and Rescue NSW

² The Bureau of Infrastructure and Transport Research Economics, 2024, [Road Deaths Australia - June Bulletin](#), BITRE.

³ World Health Organisation, 2013, [Global Status Report on Road Safety 2013](#), Luxembourg: World Health Organisation.

⁴ Emergency Management Victoria, 2017, "[State Road Crash Rescue Arrangements 2017](#)." Melbourne, Victoria.

resources proportionate to community risk. In some instances the rescue area may be reallocated to another operator, particularly if there is a repeated failure to provide adequate service.

Decision makers in NSW, however, have yet to implement similar successful reforms. Currently, NSW Police acts as the coordinating agency for rescue response across NSW. However, actual service provision is shared between NSW Ambulance, RFS, Volunteer Rescue Agency (**VRA**), State Emergency Service (**SES**) and FRNSW. The mechanisms, resource allocation, and framework for this system is managed by the State Rescue Board (**SRB**) – a board of agency representatives, administered by the Premier's Department.

Recent attempts by the FBEU to substantiate RCR performance statistics with the SRB have highlighted a lack of critical oversight in the delivery of rescue services across NSW. Concerningly, agencies responsible for RCR, and the SRB coordinating them, have repeatedly failed to exhibit a capacity to meet basic reporting expectations.

For example, rescue units operated by the SES are heavily relied upon for the provision of RCR, as overseen by the SRB. However, SES response information, gathered by the FBEU, reveals consistent failures of the agency to provide adequate and timely response to incidents and to collect relevant performance data. The information details evidence of SES rescue units arriving to incidents up to two hours after the 000 call was received, well below agreed industry standards and community expectations. In many other instances the SES were unable to confirm whether a rescue attended the incident at all [REDACTED].

While the SRB is responsible for maintaining an efficient and effective rescue service throughout NSW, the Board seem wholly unaware of these issues, failing to improve accountability and transparency. As it stands, publicly available data documenting the performance of rescue provision across NSW is limited to an annual report published by the SRB in accordance with the *State Emergency and Rescue Management Act 1989* (**SERM Act**). In accordance with s49 of the SERM Act, the Minister is to table SRB-generated reports before Parliament. Inquiries undertaken by the FBEU reveal that, on at least two occasions, no such report has been published (**Appendix B**).

The involvement of non-government organisations, such as the VRA, further diminishes critical oversight of rescue service delivery and represent an unnecessary duplication of service already provided by agencies like FRNSW. Attempts by the FBEU to produce the VRA's funding arrangement under the Government Information Public Access Act (**GIPA Act**) have thus far failed due to matters of commercial confidence. As such, it remains unclear how the NSW State Government evaluate the performance of the VRA.

These issues are just a component of broader, systemic concerns within NSW's emergency services framework: a framework that has systematically failed to provide an evidence-based, transparent and reliable service delivery.

Part 4: A Lack of Risk-Based Decision Making

Despite significant increases in population, new dwellings, hazards, and State infrastructure, the established numbers of FRNSW personnel have not increased for more than a decade. These circumstances speak to a misallocation of resources within the sector; a failure to adequately improve service delivery and to meet community expectations. These issues are particularly evident in relation to State Significant Infrastructure projects such as the Western Sydney

Airport and Aerotropolis, and Sydney Metro rail developments, and the overreliance of the volunteer emergency sector generally.

Misallocation of response areas between services

One such omission lies in the systematic misallocation of RFS and FRNSW resources and responsibility. Due to a failure to develop a framework wherein emergency service provision is proportionate to evidence-based risk-profiles, many rural fire boundaries have remained static despite extensive development and population growth. Examples of this include large sections of South-Western Sydney, one of the fastest growing regions in Australia; or Badgerys Creek, home to the new Western Sydney Airport and Aerotropolis development. Both regions continue to be defined as rural fire districts despite significant growth.

Growing communities in NSW should expect a continuity of service that is based on dynamic risk profiling which guarantees a standard of response situated in data and need. As identified, FRNSW is the only agency with a remit to guarantee incident response.

Failure to adequately plan for State Significant Infrastructure projects

a) Proportionate resourcing of The Western Sydney Airport and Western Sydney Aerotropolis

The current framework also fails to meet the emergency servicing requirements for State Significant Infrastructure. The Parliamentary Inquiry into Transport Infrastructure Supporting the Western Sydney Airport and Western Sydney Aerotropolis revealed significant shortfalls.⁵ The combined submission by FRNSW and RFS outlined the needs for this development in terms of establishing a proportionate allocation of staffing, training and new fire stations. Risk factors include (but are not limited to): the projected passenger capacity of the airport – initially planned to be 10 million passengers per annum; aviation fuel carried by road – 40 trucks per day; surrounding high volume motorways with no reticulated water supply – creating a reliance on excess fire appliances to carry suitable quantities of water to any incident; and the exponential increase in population and development – guaranteeing a proportionate increase in emergency incidents. FRNSW anticipated the area would require the establishment of five new fire stations. The NSW State Government responded with an announcement of just one new FRNSW station.⁶ While a Badgerys Creek FRNSW station has been allocated funding for land acquisition, no funding has been provided for staffing or appliances. This, combined with the fact that the most recently built FRNSW station, Oran Park Fire Station, took over 10 years to build, is deeply concerning.

b) Failure to adequately plan for Sydney Metro rail development

Like structural fires, high quality rapid response from professional firefighters can be the difference between life and death in a rail incident. The longer it takes for rescue units to commence rescue operations, the more dangerous the incident to the public and first

⁵ NSW Rural Fire Service and Fire & Rescue NSW. 2024. "[Critical Transport Infrastructure Supporting the Western Sydney International Airport and Western Sydney Aerotropolis.](#)"

⁶ Minister for Emergency Services. 2024. *Building a stronger Fire and Rescue NSW.* <https://www.nsw.gov.au/media-releases/building-a-stronger-fire-and-rescue-nsw>

responders. Hundreds of rail incidents occur throughout Sydney's existing rail tunnel networks every year. Emergency service agencies work together in these dangerous environments with shared rescue capability to safeguard the commuting public. However, the efforts of emergency personnel are soon to be hindered by the NSW State Government's failure to provide equivalent capability, and resources, for incidents occurring on the privately-operated Metro networks. Mapping undertaken by FRNSW demonstrates that a key rescue unit located at Central, integral to providing safe egress to emergency personnel at every existing rail incident, could be delayed by up to an hour, preventing FRNSW, and other agencies, ability to commence operations (**Appendix C**). These circumstances demonstrate an unacceptable risk to the NSW community.

c) Overreliance on volunteer emergency service sector generally

In June 2024, the Premier's Department published a Review of Emergency Volunteering.⁷ The review concludes that volunteer agencies are facing increased pressure due to declining rates of volunteerism, a symptom of an ageing volunteer population, protracted and more frequent natural disasters, among other factors.

The review details a 123% increase in the number of emergency incidents 'tasked' to volunteer agencies across NSW, with correlating data demonstrating that, in some instances, agencies were responding to less than ever before (**Appendix D**). The FBEU submit that these circumstances speak to the realities and limitations of volunteer agencies, issues which must be considered against the background of increasing community risk.

To address these circumstances, the review called for government to adopt greater opportunity for 'spontaneous volunteering' in the emergency services sector. The NSW State Government has since provided \$5 million in funding for non-government organisations under the Spontaneous Volunteers Support Program.⁸ The initiative follows a dangerous trend of 'hands-off' decision-making from government. The FBEU contend that such an approach fails to acknowledge the fundamental obstacles preventing improved service delivery within the sector, primarily by failing to invest in combat agencies such as FRNSW. By way of introduction to the issue, this submission will analyse concerns of transparent data surrounding the number of 'active' volunteers of the RFS.

The RFS have long purported to have the largest number of volunteer firefighters, with agency publications often identifying upwards of 70,000 volunteers. But in a recent Budget Estimates Inquiry the agency confirmed that as a few as 45 - 46,000 RFS volunteers were 'operational' firefighters.⁹

Data obtained by the FBEU through GIPA application in March 2023 indicate that these numbers are further inflated (**Appendix E**). A mere 22% of documented RFS volunteers were identified as being trained in essential competencies for small structural, vehicle, and similar firefighting activities. Competency levels specific to urban firefighting challenges were lower still, with less than 7% of volunteers trained in self-contained breathing apparatus, and fewer than 2% trained in safe work practices for structural fires.

⁷ NSW Government, 2024. [Review of Emergency Volunteering. NSW Government.](#)

⁸ 2024. [Spontaneous Volunteers Support Program. Accessed July 2024.](#)

⁹ [Parliament of NSW, 2024. "PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE NO. 8 – QUESTIONS ON NOTICE." Portfolio Committee No.8 - Customer Service. February.](#)

Similarly, documents provided by iCare in June 2024 detail that up to 7% of volunteers documented on RFS databases had no registered date of birth, a further indication of poor record-keeping on behalf of the agency (**Appendix F**).

It is perhaps unsurprising that the RFS were the only volunteer agency unable to provide the Review of Emergency Volunteering with any data pertaining to the tenure of their volunteer workforce (**Appendix G**). Despite these circumstances, the RFS continues to acquire assets and develop capability within urban environments. Data provided to the FBEU reveals a 38% increase in the procurement of RFS 'Urban Pumpers', including those allocated to metropolitan areas with a clear need for professional firefighting coverage, such as Londonderry and Appin (**Appendix H**).

Given the limitations faced by volunteer agencies within the sector, the FBEU submits that any framework seeking to demonstrate the and transparent use of public money must prioritise combat agencies like FRNSW, and work to identify and quantify the true capacity of supplementary volunteer efforts.

Part 5: Community Expectations & Trust in Government Services

A study undertaken by the FBEU in 2022 surveyed voting intentions from a cross-section of the NSW community, focussed upon matters of fire safety and service delivery. The report identified that a vast majority of participants were concerned with a guarantee of appropriate professional firefighting resources. This was particularly evident for those who identified their family home as their most significant financial asset.

In short, the people of NSW have an expectation that public money will be utilised in a manner that is both transparent and responsible. Unfortunately, in the NSW emergency service sector, this is often not the case.

a. Charitable fundraising

In 2023, the Sydney Morning Herald published a story concerning the charitable fundraising efforts of the Rural Fire Service Association (RFSA), the representative body of volunteer firefighters in NSW.¹⁰ The RFSA were purported to have employed a third-party telemarketer to raise over \$69 million of revenue from the NSW public in support of 'rural firefighters'. The telemarketer, 4Mile Pty Ltd, was accused of unethical sales tactics by former employees, particularly with regards to the targeting of the elderly. Further, RFSA financial reports demonstrated that a mere 17% of RFSA funds had been spent on the organisations core charitable purpose. As reported, this was '*not the first-time charitable donations destined to the state's volunteer firefighters have transgressed the spirit of giving*'. Similar accusations were leveled at the RFSA in 2016. These circumstances are separate to the controversy surrounding the \$51 million raised by comedian Celeste Barber, nominated to the RFS Brigades Donation Fund Trust.

The FBEU submit that these circumstances do little to promote trust in government services.

¹⁰Maddison, Max. 2023. "[A charity raised \\$69m to support NSW firefighters. They got only \\$12m.](#)" *The Sydney Morning Herald, October*.

The Herald's View. 2023. "[We will only be generous to charities we can trust.](#)" *The Sydney Morning Herald, October*

b. Section 44 costs

A section 44 event describes a localised state of emergency, declared by the RFS Commissioner in accordance with s44 of the *Rural Fire Service Act 1997*. Section 44 of the Act tasks the Commissioner to take all actions considered necessary to control or suppress bushfire.

The procurement practices of section 44 events have been subject to previous ICAC inquiry, but little information remains known about the total costs of these events.¹¹ In an early 2024 Budget Estimates Inquiry, the RFS tabled costs of 43 section 44 events for the 2019-2020 year totalling almost \$500 million.

The 2019-2020 Black Summer Bushfires Inquiry identified that some of these events were likely the result of uncontrolled backburns undertaken by RFS hazard reductions. Data obtained by the FBEU provide a further breakdown of costs associated with these events (**Appendix I**). Many of these bushfire events, including which occurred in the Blue Mountains district, have been subject to significant public criticism.

c. Aerial firefighting costs

In a new trend, considerable public money is believed to be involved in contractual arrangements between RFS and private aviation companies. A report published by the Auditor-General in 2023 cited that the agency had spent \$255.5 million on 'call-when-needed' aircraft hire arrangements.¹² Those costs were in addition to \$31 million of expenditure said to have been spent on aviation assets purchased by the RFS between 2019-2021.

[REDACTED]

It is expected that significant public money is associated with the contracts, circumstances which may raise further questions concerning the adequacy of the NSW Government Procurement Framework.

¹¹ Independent Commission Against Corruption, 2015. [Investigation into the Conduct of Officers of the NSW Rural Fire Service and Others](#). Sydney: ICAC report

¹² NSW Auditor General, 2023. [Planning and managing bushfire equipment](#). Sydney: Auditors Office of New South Wales.

[REDACTED]

Conclusion

This inquiry can provide important foundations for an accountable and transparent framework of service-delivery. For the emergency service sector, the connection between performance and outcomes, or the standard of response, can be a matter of life and death. This fact demands an increasingly high standard of accountability of sector agencies. Furthermore, community expectations call for a standard of emergency service provision that is proportionate to risk, accountable to evidence and transparent in delivery. On their worst day, the people of NSW expect nothing less.

As outlined above, the current NSW emergency service framework has repeatedly failed to deliver on any such standard. The FBEU submits that the NSW State Government must take a proactive approach to reverse these circumstances. A change of approach, however, must be guided by a data-centric, risk-based framework, standardised across all agencies.

Both professional and volunteer organisations will continue to play an important role in service delivery. However, the reality of a growing State demands a guaranteed standard of response. The evidence provided above, however, suggests the required standard of cover must be primarily delivered by a professional service – like FRNSW.

The FBEU contend that structural reform within the sector is urgently needed to improve these circumstances and to deliver improved outcomes for our State.

Kind regards,



Leighton Drury

State Secretary

FBEU SUBMISSION APPENDIX

A Framework for Performance Reporting and Driving Wellbeing Outcomes in NSW

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B – Missing SRB Annual Reports

Thursday, July 25, 2024 at 11:56:22 Australian Eastern Standard Time

Subject: Re: SRB

Date: Friday 12 July 2024 at 9:42:50 AM Australian Eastern Standard Time

Attachments: ~WRD0437.jpg, image001.png, image002.png, image003.png, image004.png, image005.png

OFFICIAL

Hi

As you've said below we've identified that the 20-21 State Rescue Board Annual Report was produced but was never tabled in Parliament. This has been resubmitted to current Minister for Emergency Services for tabling, and I understand a copy have been provided.

Further, through the search for these I've confirmed that no annual report was prepared for the 2021-22 financial year. A report is being prepared for the Board to provide an overview of its activities over that period for it to consider and provide to the Minister. I'll provide a copy as soon as possible.

If there's any specific details that you're after in relation to the missing report, please feel free to get in touch and I'll let you know if I can help out.

Regards,
Cam.


Associate Director
New South Wales Premier's Department



I acknowledge the traditional custodians of the land and pay respects to Elders past and present. I also acknowledge all the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander staff working with NSW Government at this time.

C – Rescue Response Metro Lines

Rail Fire & Emergency (RFE) Potential Station Coverage - Current Central Only



Legend

- 5 mins
- 10 mins
- 15 mins
- 20 mins
- 25 mins
- 30 mins
- ▲ NW & Airport Metro Stns
- Potential RFE Locations
- Rail_Station_Point
- ✈ Western Sydney Airport
- Rail_Track

Disclaimer: This map provides a GENERAL INDICATION ONLY of rescue coverage by the relevant unit / service. It, or the data it was based on, is not used in any way for any response purposes.

The information contained in this map has been provided in good faith. Whilst all effort has been made to ensure its accuracy and completeness, the data providers take no responsibility for errors or omissions, or damage that may result from the use of this information.

2 Better Planning for Volunteering into the Future

The Review’s scope requires it to consider how well-placed NSW is to meet future demand for emergency volunteers.

Demand on NSW’s emergency response and recovery agencies, and their emergency volunteer workforce, has increased significantly in recent years. It is well accepted that this trend is expected to continue into the future, as NSW continues to experience the dual impacts of population growth and more frequent, protracted and compounding natural disaster events. However, the implications of this for NSW’s future emergency management capability and capacity are less well understood.

The establishment of a collaborative multi-agency approach to forecasting the future capability and capacity needs of the emergency volunteering workforce and monitoring progress towards these is needed to support a more strategic approach to volunteer workforce planning and capability development, and to provide a greater level of assurance about NSW’s preparedness to meet future increased demand.

Increased demand for emergency volunteers

Reliable data on the number of hours of service performed by emergency volunteers is not routinely collected. However, volunteers and volunteer organisations consistently report that recent years have seen an increased demand for emergency volunteers.

The Review’s first report identified that the number of volunteers associated with NSW’s emergency services organisations has remained relatively stable in recent years. Over the ten years to 2022, the emergency services volunteering workforce grew by less than 1%. Over a similar period, the number of incidents tasked¹ to volunteer emergency service organisations has increased by more than 123%:




Figure 2.1 – Number of incidents tasked to volunteer emergency services.

¹ Incidents tasked refers to an activity for which an emergency service has been requested to attend either by the community or another emergency service. Not all incidents result in a response by an emergency service.

E – RFS Training Numbers GIPA

All data is accurate as of 1 March 2023 and data has been captured via Business Intelligence Portal (which extracts the data directly from SAP). The numbers include both volunteers and staff (i.e. members).

- Number of members of the RFS: **72,630**
- Number of members with Bush Firefighter competency: **50,716**
- Number of members with Village Firefighter competency: **16,240**
- Number of members with Breathing Apparatus Operator competency: **4,550**
- Number of members with Advanced Structural Firefighter competency: **833**



Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009

Background

GIPA application was received from the Fire Brigade Employees' Union on:

- 1) Documentation pertaining to the number of Rural Fire Service (RFS) volunteer firefighters budgeted for by iCare, specifically in the context of existing presumptive legislation for firefighter cancer.
- 2) Documentation utilized by relevant parties that detail the variables and methodologies employed to calculate the above mentioned figure.

The financial impact of the introduction of the *Workers Compensation Legislation Amendment (Firefighters) Act 2018* was assessed by external actuarial consultants (Finity Consulting) in February 2019. The information below are extracts taken from their final report to icare dated 5th February 2019.

Response

- 1) *Documentation pertaining to the number of Rural Fire Service (RFS) volunteer firefighters budgeted for by iCare, specifically in the context of existing presumptive legislation for firefighter cancer.*

B.1 Raw Data

Table B.1 summarises the raw volunteer exposure data.

Table B.1 – Volunteer Exposure: Raw Data

Age Band	Active Volunteers						Non-Active Volunteers					
	Years of Service					Total	Years of Service					Total
	0-5	5-10	10-15	15-25	25+		0-5	5-10	10-15	15-25	25+	
Out of scope												
Total	Out of scope					60,352	Out of scope					81,903

2) *Documentation utilized by relevant parties that detail the variables and methodologies employed to calculate the above mentioned figure.*

RFS Exposure

We received data relating to volunteers' service periods, which was extracted from the RFS HR system. The historical record was incomplete, as full digital records were not kept until the 1990s. There were some missing data fields for some members, and in some instances the dates appeared to be erroneous. We assessed the quality of the service data as reasonable overall.

The volunteer data distinguished between "Operational" and "Non-Operational" volunteer service; the former relates to direct firefighting activity and the latter to related support operations.

RFS management indicated that many volunteers in Non-Operational roles would have exposure to the hazards of fire scenes – for example, communication units would travel to report from fire grounds. In addition, only a very small proportion of the volunteers represented in the data had only Non-Operational service – many volunteers' service comprised period(s) in Operational roles as well as period(s) in Non-Operational roles.

Under the presumptive legislation, any exposure to fire hazards at any time during a volunteer's service means that the entire service period counts towards the qualifying periods.

Given the information above:

- We have treated all volunteers in the data as eligible firefighters
- For the purpose of assessing whether a volunteer meets qualifying service periods, we have added together all of their service periods (Operational and Non-Operational).

Further detail relating to the RFS exposure data and our assumptions is set out in Attachment A.

A Data Supplied

A.1 Discussions

As well as receiving the data described below, we had a number of very helpful conversations with 3(a) [REDACTED]. We are grateful for this assistance.

A.2 Service Data

Data relating to volunteers' service periods was extracted from the RFS HR system, as at 7 September 2017. The data included:

- Volunteer number, date of birth and gender
- Details of service period(s) – start and end dates, for each period
- Classification of each volunteer/service record into "Operational" (98% of records), "Operational Support" (2%) or "RFS CFU" (0.2%).

The historical record was incomplete, as full digital records were not kept until the 1990s.

We assessed the quality of the service data as reasonable overall. There were 142,255 unique volunteers represented on the database, of which:

- 9,350 (7%) were missing date of birth only
- 8,428 (6%) were missing date of birth and start date
- 474 (0.3%) were missing all three of date of birth, start and end date
- 35 (0.0%) were missing other combinations of dates.

As well as missing data, some date fields contained data which appeared to be erroneous; for example, many dates appeared as the 'default' date 1 January 1901, and some volunteers were recorded as having the same date of birth and start date.

Where data was missing or clearly invalid (it was not always possible to tell), we made assumptions to 'fill the gaps'. For example:

- Where date of birth was missing, we assumed the volunteer was aged 34 on joining (the average age of joining for volunteers with dates of birth)
- Where the date of birth implied a volunteer joined before the age of 16, we assumed they were 16 at start date (noting that in recent years membership of brigades has been open to only individuals from age 16)
- Where service dates were missing, we assumed a service period of 11 years (the average period for records that appeared sensible)
- Where service end date was missing, we assumed the service was current – except where the current age is 90 or more, in which case we assumed service had ended at age 90.

G – Tenure of Volunteers

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Average tenure of volunteers has not changed since 2016

It has remained relatively stable at 7 years, as demonstrated in the graph below²⁰.




Figure B.4 – Average tenure of emergency services volunteers.

²⁰ This graph does not include average tenure for the NSW Rural Fire Service, who were unable to provide data.

H – RFS Urban Pumpers GIPA

While the RFS has satisfied its obligations under the GIPA Act in its document provided with the Notice dated 3 July 2023, in the interests of transparency, it has also chosen to respond to your additional question.

The RFS has manufactured 22 new urban pumpers, all Category 10 appliances, between FY18/19 and FY 22/23. The assigned location for each new pumper is set out in the table.

Data is accurate as at 24 July 2023.

FY	Brigade
FY18/19	Mt Wilson
FY18/19	Lake Cathie
FY18/19	Terrey Hills
FY18/19	Bargo
FY19/20	Cooranbong
FY19/20	Regentville
FY19/20	Casula
FY19/20	Appin
FY20/21	Wallacia
FY20/21	Londonderry
FY20/21	Gerringong
FY20/21	Kariong
FY20/21	Wamberal
FY20/21	Lochinvar
FY20/21	Bungendore
FY20/21	Thurgoona
FY20/21	North West - Orange
FY21/22	Gledswood
FY21/22	Lennox Head
FY21/22	Woodburn
FY21/22	Dalmeny
FY22/23	Old Bar



R24-2573: Created Record

A record created pursuant to section 75(1) of the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 in response to:

"Detailed breakdown of RFS cost associated with the following Section 44 declarations from the 2019-2020 bushfire season, as identified in the RFS submission to Budget Estimates QoN (see p25 'Attachment B'), found at: [link]

S44-19/20007 Lithgow LGA

S44-19/20030 Blue Mountains, Bathurst, Lithgow and Oeron LGAs

S44-19/20031 Hawkesbury LGA and part of Lithgow LGA

S44-19/20038* Hawkesbury LGA and part of Lithgow LGA"

(*) reference updated from original reference to S44-19/20031.

▣ S44-19/20007 Lithgow LGA	ND - Chem/Consum	21,990.64
	ND - Snackpack/Water	36.35
	ND Aircraft Hire	235,124.46
	ND Heavy Plant	18,510.00
	ND Meals and Accom.	17,205.38
	ND Other	1,192.96
	ND Overtime Tmp Staff	49,754.41
S44-19/20007 Lithgow LGA Total		343,814.20
▣ S44-19/20030 Blue Mountains, Bathurst, O	ND - Chem/Consum	10,350.04
	ND - Snackpack/Water	882.41
	ND Aircraft Hire	304,247.83
	ND Heavy Plant	14,235.00
	ND Meals and Accom.	4,461.46
	ND Other	863.04
	ND Overtime Tmp Staff	15,883.81
	ND PME Hire	0.00
S44-19/20030 Blue Mountains, Bathurst, O Total		350,923.59
▣ S44-19/20031 Hawkesbury and part Lithgow	ND - Chem/Consum	3,640,208.34
	ND - Snackpack/Water	47,844.41
	ND Aircraft Hire	12,001,186.33
	ND Fuel	335,510.22
	ND Heavy Plant	2,935,310.78
	ND Meals and Accom.	1,810,155.50
	ND Other	2,605,727.23
	ND Overtime Tmp Staff	2,260,877.62
	ND PME Hire	218,942.29
S44-19/20031 Hawkesbury and part Lithgow Total		25,855,762.72
▣ S44-19/20038 Blue Mountains LGA	ND - Chem/Consum	479,472.78
	ND - Snackpack/Water	38,548.77
	ND Aircraft Hire	3,734,687.56
	ND Fuel	173,293.79
	ND Heavy Plant	862,064.89
	ND Meals and Accom.	696,511.49
	ND Other	1,976,529.70
	ND Overtime Tmp Staff	724,905.72
	ND PME Hire	82,323.61
S44-19/20038 Blue Mountains LGA Total		8,768,338.31

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